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 CRIMINAL LAW – DEATH SENTENCE APPEAL 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a death sentence following a second penalty hearing conducted pursuant to a 
remand by the Nevada Supreme Court. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
  
 Appellant’s arguments failed to establish reversible error and the Nevada Supreme Court 
affirmed his death sentence. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Appellant Marlo Thomas and Kenya Hall, were charged with two counts of first-degree 
murder with the use of a deadly weapon and several other crimes.  The charges stemmed from an 
early morning robbery of a restaurant where Thomas stabbed two employees to death.  Thomas, 
Hall, and Thomas’s wife were arrested later that day. 
 After their arrest, Hall was interview by Officer Bailey, a Nevada Highway Patrol 
Officer.  Hall confessed to his role in the crimes, implicated Thomas, and agreed to plead guilty 
to lesser charges in exchange for testifying against Thomas.  Hall testified at Thomas’s 
preliminary hearing but refused to testify further.  Hall’s preliminary hearing testimony was read 
into the record at Thomas’s trial, where a jury convicted Thomas on two counts of first-degree 
murder with the use of a deadly weapon and several other crimes.  After a penalty hearing, the 
jury returned two death verdicts for the murders and life in prison without parole for the 
remaining convictions.  
 On direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Thomas’s conviction and 
sentence.2  Subsequently, Thomas filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district 
court denied.  Thomas appealed that denial to the Nevada Supreme Court, which found that 
Thomas’s trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to an improper penalty phase jury 
instruction on the possibility of sentence commutation.  The Court remanded the case for a new 
penalty hearing.3
 On remand, the district court bifurcated the penalty hearing into an eligibility phase and 
selection phase.  During the eligibility phase, the State alleged four aggravators: (1) Thomas had 
a prior conviction for a felony involving violence or threat of violence;4 (2) Thomas had a 
second such conviction; (3) the murders were committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest;5 and 
(4) Thomas was convicted in the instant proceeding of more than one murder.6  In support of the 
                                                 
1 By James Robertson 
2 Thomas v. State, 114 Nev. 1127, 967 P.2d 1111 (1998). 
3 Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 83 P.3d 818 (2004). 
4 NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(2)(b) (2005). 
5 § 200.033(5). 
6 § 200.033(12). 
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alleged aggravators the State  presented Hall’s preliminary testimony that read into the record by 
Officer Bailey.  In addition, the State admitted the details of Thomas’s 1990 conviction for 
attempted robbery, and Thomas’s 1996 conviction for battery with substantial bodily harm. 
 After deliberating on death eligibility, the jury found all four aggravators, and based on 
testimony from Thomas’s family members, the jury found seven mitigators: (1) Thomas 
accepted responsibility for the crimes; (2) cooperated with the investigation but diverted the 
truth; (3) demonstrated remorse; (4) counseled others against criminal acts; (5) suffered learning 
and emotional disabilities; (6) found religion; (7) and had been denied by his father.  The jury 
determined that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, and the hearing proceeded to the 
selection phase.   
 During the selection phase, the State called a records supervisor for the Division of 
Parole and Probation, who authenticated 25 juvenile court petitions charging Thomas with 
several crimes, as well as a juvenile court order listing Thomas’s entire juvenile history and 
certifying 17 year old Thomas as in adult in his 1990 robbery case.  In addition, ten correctional 
officers testified about Thomas’s behavior while in prison and authenticated prison discipline 
documents. 
 The selection phase also included victim-impact testimony from the fathers of the two 
restaurant stabbing victims. One of the fathers, Mr. Dixon, referred to Thomas as “the lowest for 
of social sewage” and was immediately interrupted by an objection from Thomas’s counsel.  The 
district court advised Mr. Dixon to limit his testimony to the impact of his son’s death on his 
family, but the court did not formally sustain the objection.  Thomas called five fellow inmates, 
the warden of his present institution, and his mother to testify on his behalf.  Finally, Thomas 
gave a statement in allocution, in which he expressed remorse.  After deliberating, the jury 
returned two verdicts of death, which Thomas appealed in the present case. 
 
Discussion 
  
 The Court reviewed Thomas’s appeal of his death sentence en banc, Justice Hardesty 
delivered the opinion of the Court.  
 
1. Application of Crawford v. Washington and the Confrontation Clause 
 
 Thomas argued that the district court violated his right to confrontation7, as interpreted in 
Crawford v. Washington8, during the eligibility phase by allowing Officer Bailey to testify about 
Hall’s statements during questioning and by admitting the transcript of the questioning.  Thomas 
also argued that the district court violated the same right, during the selection phase, by 
admitting evidence of his juvenile criminal history and behavior while in prison. The Court 
rejected these arguments, citing Summers v. State9, in which it held that Crawford and the 
Confrontation Clause do not apply during a capital penalty hearing. 
    
2. Admission of “Other Matter” Evidence at the Eligibility Phase 
 
                                                 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
8 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that the Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay unless the 
declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination). 
9 122 Nev. ___, 148 P.3d 727(Adv. Op. No. 112, Dec. 28, 2006). 
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 Thomas argued that the district court erred by allowing the State the present “other 
matter” evidence during the eligibility phase.  There are three proper purposes for which the 
State may introduce evidence at a capital penalty hearing: “to prove an enumerated aggravator, 
to rebut specific mitigating evidence, or to aid the jury in determining the appropriate sentence 
after any enumerated aggravating circumstance have been weighed against any mitigating 
circumstance.”10  The Court referred to the evidence submitted for the third purpose as “other 
matter,” which is “not admissible for use by the jury in determining the existence of aggravating 
circumstance or weighing them against mitigating circumstances.”11  Evidence presented to 
rebut specific mitigating evidence is not “other matter” and it is permissible during the eligibility 
phase if the rebuttal is targeted toward specific mitigation evidence, if not the evidence is other 
matter which the State can only present during the selection phase.12  In mitigation, Thomas 
called his mother to testify that Thomas’s childhood was good until she had a baby and started 
ignoring him and beat him.  On cross-examination, the State produced the juvenile court order 
pertaining to Thomas’s 1990 robbery charge, which contained statements purportedly by Ms. 
Thomas.   The State asked Ms. Thomas if, in 1990, she said Thomas was spoil and that her 
control of him had been fair, which she could not recall.  The Court found that these questions 
were proper rebuttal given Ms. Thomas’s specific testimony that she had ignored and beaten 
Thomas.   
 The State also asked Ms. Thomas if she had said that Thomas was “becoming more 
dangerous” or “would get into drugs or do things for quick money.”  The Court found that the 
use of these statements was improper because they were not true rebuttal; Ms. Thomas never 
testified on direct examination that Thomas was not dangerous or violent, did not use drugs, or 
committed crimes.  In fact she testified that she knew he got in fights, committed crimes, and 
used drugs.  The Court reasoned that because these prior statements were not used to prove an 
aggravator or rebut specific mitigating evidence, they were “other matter” evidence not proper at 
the eligibility phase.  However, the Court concluded that the error was minimal and did not affect 
his substantial rights.13
  
 3. Causation Between Mitigating Evidence and the Crime 
 
 Thomas also argued that the district court erred by allowing the State to argue, in its 
eligibility phase closing, that there has to be “some causation, connection” between the 
mitigating circumstances that occur in a person’s life and the crime before the occurrences 
become a mitigating circumstance.  The Court agreed that the State’s argument was improper, 
but concluded that the impropriety was not prejudicial because the jury instructions expressly 
permitted the jury to consider the mitigating circumstance as factors in determining moral 
culpability and correctly required no causation between the factors presented and the crime.  
 
 4. Cumulative Bad Acts Testimony and an Improper Victim Impact Statement
  
 Thomas argued that cumulative bad acts testimony and an improper victim impact 
statement rendered his penalty hearing fundamentally unfair.  Relevant evidence “may be 
                                                 
10 Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732, 746, 6 P.3d 987, 997 (2000). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.602 (2005). 
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excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by…needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”14  Applying an abuse of discretion standard,15  the Court concluded that 
the evidence presented by the ten correctional officers was not excessively cumulative because 
very little testimony repeated previous evidence, the jury was entitled to learn of Thomas’s 
disciplinary record and criminal history, and each incident presented revealed Thomas’s capacity 
for threatening and potentially dangerous behavior. 
 Thomas also challenged Mr. Dixon’s statement, in his victim-impact testimony, that 
Thomas was “the lowest from of social sewage.”  The Court agreed that this statement was 
improper, but ruled that the statement did not require reversal.  The Court based this ruling on 
the fact that the district court properly admonished Mr. Dixon, the jury presumably expected Mr. 
Dixon to abhor Thomas, and Mr. Dixon never expressed his views about sentencing.  
 
 5. Mitigating Evidence and Instructions at the Selection Phase 
 
  a. Lack of Premeditation 
 
 Thomas argued that the district court erred during the selection phase by limiting his 
presentation of mitigating evidence and refusing a mitigation instruction.  The district court 
refused Thomas’s request that the jury be instructed that “the homicide occurred during a 
confrontation and as such there was no premeditated intent to cause the death.”  NRS 175.554(1) 
requires the district court to instruct on “alleged mitigators upon which evidence has been 
presented and does not restrict such instruction to the enumerated statutory mitigators.”16  
Evidence that Thomas lacked premeditation was admitted into the record through his 
interrogation, in which he made a claim that the killings were done in self-defense.  Thus, the 
Court found that Thomas was entitled to an instruction that he was alleging lack of premeditation 
as a mitigating circumstance.  However, the Court also found that Thomas’s proposed instruction 
was worded as a theory of law and was therefore improper.17  In addition, Thomas failed to 
establish authority for the proposition that premeditation cannot, as a matter of law, be formed 
during a confrontation.  Finally, the jury was instructed that it could find “any other mitigating 
circumstances” and Thomas had argued to the jury that the killings were not premeditated. 
   
  b. The Role of an Uncharged Participant 
 
 Thomas argued that he should have been permitted to argue that his wife’s involvement 
in the crimes and the State’s failure to charge her, for her involvement, were mitigating 
circumstances.  In rejecting this argument, the Court pointed to NRS 175.552(3) which provides 
that mitigating circumstances must relate to “the offense, defendant, or victim and on any other 
matter which the court deems relevant to sentence.”  The Court found that Thomas failed to 
show how the State’s decision not to prosecute his wife was relevant to his sentence. 
 
 6. The Constitutionality of Nevada’s Death Penalty Scheme 
 
                                                 
14 NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.035(2) (2005). 
15 Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1008, 103 P.3d 25, 29 (2004). 
16 Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 238, 994 P.2d 700, 715 (2000). 
17 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.554(1) (2005).   
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 Finally, Thomas argued that the Nevada death penalty scheme is unconstitutional, in part, 
because it prevents a defendant from participating in the decision to seek death the death penalty.  
The Court, relying on its own precedent, stated that matters of prosecution in any criminal case 
are within the entire control of the district attorney absent any unconstitutional discrimination.18
 
 7. Mandatory Death Sentence Review 
 
 Pursuant to NRS 177.055(2)(c)-(e), the Court reviewed Thomas’s death sentence.  The 
Court determined that the evidence supported the findings of aggravating circumstances, the 
sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor, and 
the sentence was not excessive, considering the crime and the defendant.   
 
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions 
 
 Justice Rose, with whom Justices Maupin and Douglas agreed, delivered a concurring 
opinion stating his belief that in a bifurcated capital penalty hearing the right to confront the 
declarant of testimonial hearsay only extends to evidence admitted during the eligibility phase.  
Here Officer Bailey’s testimonial hearsay about Hall’s statements was admitted during the 
eligibility phase, but because Hall was not available to testify and because Thomas had an 
opportunity to cross-examine him during the preliminary hearing it was not error to admit that 
evidence.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 While it was found that Thomas’s penalty hearing was not free of error, the Court 
concluded that the sentence was fair and none of Thomas’s arguments established reversible 
error. 
                                                 
18 Cairns v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 113, 508 P.2d 1015, 1017 (1973). 
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